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The British Miners' Strike:
The British miners'strike had elements o f a classic confrontation between 
the New Right and a well-organised and militant union. While no simple 
lessons can be transported from Britain to Australia, questions must be asked 
about the role o f the Labour Party, the lack of support from the rest of the 
union movement and about the tactics of the miners themselves. Mike 
Donaldson asks some of the questions and discusses the issues.
a  special issue of The Miner, the journal o f  the 
National Union of Mineworkers (NU M), published 
on 7 March, carried the banner headline, "Victory? 
What Victory? The Fight Goes On". In it, the NUM stated, 
'T he  {National Coal) Board wanted to close 20 pits and 
axe 20,000 j o b s .... They have not been able to do so. They 
wanted to close five pits immediately .... They have not 
been able to  do so. They wanted to commit the union to 
signing an agreement closing pits on economic grounds. 
We have no t and  will never do  so. The Board did not want 
any independent appeal body introduced into the colliery 
review procedure. They have been fo rc e d  to accept such 
a b o d y" (italics in the original).
Surprisingly, given that all mass media coverage has 
been to the contrary, most mineworkers appeared to agree 
with The M iner'ssta tem ent. A poll conducted for Granada 
TV's Union W orld  found that less than one in four miners
believed that they had suffered defeat, and 68 percent said 
they were ready to take industrial action against pit 
closures in their districts.
And yet the miners clearly did not win. The NUM did 
not achieve its objectives, the closure program has not been 
withdrawn, and the mineworkers went back without a 
negotiated settlement. Over twelve months of intense 
struggle, 9,000 were arrested. 600 sacked, 300 imprisoned, 
some for up to five years, and two killed, and the union was 
badly divided internally.
But the NUM was not smashed, as the Thatcher 
government intended. As Peter Carter ,1 a National 
Industrial organiser with the Communist Party of Great 
Britain (CPGB), pul it, the government's  strategy was to 
isolate and destroy the best organised and most militant 
sections of the labour movement, and for this the Thatcher 
government had prepared meticulously.
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The Thatcher Government's Preparations
r he Conservative Party was deeply affected by the victories of the miners in 1972 and 1974, and the Energy Minister under Conservative Prime Minister 
Healh was directed by the new Conservative leadership to 
provide a detailed report on the lessons that could be 
drawn from the government's defeats of those years.
According to  Beynon and M cM ylor,2 the resulting 
report, based on highly confidential discussions with 
business people and former public servants, "was a deeply 
sobering one for senior Conservatives". It pointed to the 
potential power of well organised unions in key industries, 
and drew attention to  the concentration of industrial 
power caused by advanced technology, the economy's 
dependence on electricity and the central role of coal. The 
report said that the increasing complexity of electricity 
generation meant that the state could no longer use the 
armed forces to take over the running of the coal and oil- 
fired power stations.
It was against this background ihat Thatcher directed 
Nicholas Ridley, currently the Minister for Transport, to 
produce a more detailed and strategic document. This 
report was widely leaked in 1978. and made quite clear the 
intentions of the Conservative Party before it even became 
the government. The report, as it was outlined in The 
Economist, said, in part:
Every precaution should be taken against a challenge in 
electricity or gas. Anyway, redundancies in those industries are 
unlikely to  be required. The group believes that the most likely 
battleground will be the coal industry. They would like a 
Thatcher government to: a) build up m axim um  coal stocks 
particularly in the power stations: b )m ake contingency plans for 
the import o f  coal: c) encourage the recruitment o f  non-union 
lorry drivers by haulage companies to help move coal where 
necessary: d) introduce dual coal /  oil firing in all power stations 
as quickly as possible.
In addition, the report recommended that the greatest 
deterrent to any strike was "to cut off the money supply to 
the workers and make the union finance them". It also 
suggested that there should be a large, mobile squad of 
police equipped and prepared to handle pickets and 
protect non-union drivers to cross piclet lines.3
/ n 1981, British coal stocks stood at 37 million tonnes; three years later they had risen 35 percent to 57 million. In 1982, the head of the Central Electricity Generating 
Board (CEGB), the wealthiest body in England, with assets 
of 40 thousand million pounds, was replaced. He had been 
instructed to  substitute oil fqr coal in the power stations 
and to accumulate coal stocks. He was reported to have 
thought that this view was "hysterical". In the year that he 
left the CEGB, oil imports increased by 33 percent.4
In 1983, coal fuelled 76 percent of electricity generation, 
but during the strike oil became the major fuel including 
the main fuel for electricity generated for industry,5 During 
the third week in January  1985, with most of the country 
snow-covered and some parts experiencing the lowest 
temperatures for 20 years, the power stations produced an 
all-time record 46,125 megawatts of electricity. It was the 
third night that month that power supply had reached 
record levels. The new chairman of the CEGB. formerly 
head of the a tom ic Energy Authority, privately boasted of 
his role in defeating the miners.* The cost was 
astronomical. Early in September 1984 it was revealed that 
the extra costs were of the order of 20 million pounds per 
week.
"The government's strategy was to isolate
and destroy the best organised and most The Miners' Response 
militant sections o f the labour movement, 
and for this the 1 hatcher government had 
prepared meticulously .... "
Michael Crick commented, "During the early part o f  the 
1984-85 dispute the government persistently refused to 
intervene: most of its work had already been carried 
out".7 Coal stocks had been built up and alternative energy 
sources found for the power stations. Legislation was 
enacted reducing social security benefits for strikers' 
families. Employers were armed with sanctions under the 
civil law and the police had in place co-ordinating 
mechanisms to minimise the effects of flying pickets.
On the other hand, according to Hy we! Francis, chair of 
the Wales Congress in Support of Mining Communities, 
and chair of the Welsh Communist Party's Energy and 
M in ing  A d v iso ry  C o m m it te e ,  the m in e rs  were 
"exceptionally ill-prepared",s
The National Coal Board, with tripartite consultation, 
had trade union representatives on its decision making 
bodies and subscribed to the tripartite formulation, the 
Plan fo r  Coal, re-signed as recently as 1980. In case senior 
management had been intected by this proximity to trade 
unionists, the Thatcher government moved quickly to 
install American import, Ian MacGregor, who had been 
responsible lor managing the butchering of British Steel, 
Britain's government-owned steel corporation, and before 
that, British Leyland.
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"W'W’Z i th  that remarkable clarity of vision allowed by 
W m r  hindsight, most commentators within the labour
* * movement and the NUM itself now suggest that 
the failure to hold a national ballot of NUM miners was a 
tactical mistake. It was a mistake because, as one miner put 
it "it was like a monkey on our back" throughout the year, 
enabling Tory propagandists to sling at the trade union 
movement yet again that old, old favourite — that trade 
unions are anti-democratic.
The decision not to hold a national ballot was a mistake 
because it cut across the NUM 's long established principle 
of national unity, national decisions and national action. 
The NUM general secretary, Peter Heathfield, put a 
convincing argument against the holding of the ballot thus.
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"It cannot be right for one man to vote another man out oL 
a j o b ; .... a ballot on wages is a ballot which everyone enters 
on an  equal basis and everyone is affected equally; on jobs 
it is a different matter, especially when jobs are at risk in 
some areas and not others",
But, nonetheless, the absence o f  a national ballot 
allowed those pits which continued to work to justify their 
action by saying that, because no ballot had been held, they 
could legitimately continue producing. Beynon suggests 
that this, in turn, meant that many other workers refused 
solidarity action because "the miners can't get their own 
members out".9 Mass picketing of working pits was also a 
direct consequence of the absence of a ballot. The struggle 
to convince the vast majority of the Nottinghamshire 
miners and the other Midlands pits that they should 
engage in a national struggle was not assisted by what they 
saw as their disenfranchisement. The strike became, in 
part, and was projected by the media as being almost
entirely, a moral, political and physical struggle within the 
working class movement.
Finally, failure to hold a ballot was a mistake because it 
now appears almost certain that had a national ballot been 
held at the opportune  time, it would have been won. 
Seasoned communist militants tike George Bolton, vice- 
president of the Scottish Area of the NUM and Alan 
Baker, a Lodge secretary from Wales, said that the NUM 
could have won a ballot "hands down" in April or M ay .10
According to Beynon,*1, where opinion polls had been 
carried out am ong the miners, as they had been on at least 
five separate occasions in different parts o f  the country 
between M arch and July, the results showed "support for 
the strike which was deeply set and surprisingly strong" — 
in two M O RI polls, 62 percent in March and 68 percent in 
April, supported the strike. The Guardian too, suggested 
that, even in the closing weeks, 55 percent o f  the miners still 
backed the strike.
It is easy enough to appreciate why the rank and file 
miners did not want a ballot -  Thatcher wanted one, 
MacGregor wanted one and the media wanted one.
A scab union had existed in Nottinghamshire between 
1926 and 1937, and in the 1979 and 1983 general elections, 
several traditional mining constituencies had fallen to the 
Conservatives. The Labour Party was losing ground even 
before the strike and, according to some within it, 
continued to do so with increasing rapidity as the strike 
developed.
The Labour Party Assesses Itself
J he position of what is called, lor reasons t don'l understand, the "hard" left of the Labour Party was predictable and probably accurate — the leadership 
of the Labour Party "sold out" the miners. Indeed, 
Labour's parliamentary leader, Neil Kinnock, was widely
derided by strikers as "Ramsay McKinnock", after 
Ramsay M acDonald, Labour 's leader during the 1926 
General Strike and the Labour Party failed to raise, 
vigorously questions of unemployment and energy policy, 
or to question the workings of the police and the legal 
system.
The Labour Party's "soft" (?) left grouping, the Labour 
Co-ordinating Committee published its own analysis After 
the Strike, which was also critical o f  th Party's leadership. 
The fa c t that the strike was inevitable fro m  day one o f  Thatcher's 
second term, and that the stakes being played fo r  were so high, 
never seemed to he fu lly  grasped by the Labour leadership. From 
the outset they acted as though the strike h’u.v an embarrassing 
diversion fro m  “real politics" in Parliament and the electoral 
arena. They appeared to wait impatiently fo r  the strike to end..11
The Labour Co-ordinating Committee said that the 
Labour Party passed its time stating what it did not, 
support and was able to produce only one lea (let during the
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12 months. The analysis concludes, "II the strike shows 
anything it is that centre poltiicsand the new realism art’ 
not adequate weapons to take on Thatcherism".1-1
The Trade Union Response
innock spoke, it is true, in the autum n at the Trade 
Union Congress (TUC) and at the Labour Party 
national conference in support of the miners (but, 
says Beynon, by implication criticising them)14 and there 
were resolutions passed of solidarity and support at both 
conferences, even though the N UM  had waited five 
months on into the strike before approaching the TUC for 
I support.
But the 'piling up of leftwing block votes" at both
I conferences did not mean that there was a general, concerted or dynamic lead given for industrial action or even to honour the picket lines.15 With the exception of the 
i rail unions who had supported the NUM from the 
beginning and some sections of the Transport and General 
Workers' Union, the official trade union movement was 
either unwilling (as were the power workers and 
electricians) or unable (left unions) to deliver the goods in 
any sustained and systematic way with industrial action at 
the point of production. As Francis bitterly commented, 
trade union solidarity has at best been reduced to 75 turkeysfrom  
Uanwern steelworkers. A t its worst, it's the army o f  well-paid 
faceless scab lorry drivers trundling along the M4 to supply 
foreign coke to the Uanwern "brothers" who supplied the 
turkeys.16
Although every one of the hard-coal pits struck and no 
coking coal was produced at all, the steelworkers, whose 
industry depends on coke, were unable to take solidarity 
action. Not only did the divisions am ong the miners and 
the absence of a ballot impair the legitimacy of the strike in 
the eyes of steel and power workers, and become the 
pretext o r  excuse for non-existent industrial support, but 
the steelworkers, in particular, had been devastated by 
a closure program under the very MacGregor who was 
now attempting a  similar job  on the coal industry. As one 
miner put it, "The steel workers are shell-shocked after 
what has happened to them, it's like asking for a blood 
transfusion from a corpse".17
The British Steel C orporation  came to the assistance of 
the Coal Board by not discouraging the widely circulated 
rumours that of the five steel "super mills" that remained 
open, one or even iwo, might "have to close".
In South Wales, steelworkers in the giant strip mills on 
the coast co-operated in the limitation of  supplies of  coal 
and coke under the close supervision of rail unionists and 
NUM delegates. Steel production was cut back as coal and 
coke deliveries were reduced to  10 thousand tonnes a  week 
during the first few months of the strike, until the NUM 
declared that a complete blockage would be placed on fuel 
deliveries to steelworks. By October, South Wales 
steelworks were receiving over 20 thousand tonnes a week, 
twice as much as they were receiving before the blockade 
was imposed.
Miners, their wives and strike supporters massed day 
and night at the gates to prevent the deliveries, as trucks 
from the same haulage firms that had been used to  break 
the steelworkers' strike four years earlier, broke through.
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travelling in heavily protected convoys. Despite twenty- 
four hour mass picketing, and hundreds of  arrests, the 
supplies were never halted for more than a day or tw o.18
The mass-picketing tactic failed, generally, perhaps 
because the economic situation had changed so 
dramatically since 1972 and 1974, when it had been 
employed with considerable success. As George Bolton 
commented.
When you were addressing factory gate meetings .... you got 
support in terms o f  money and o f  food . But you  got a strong 
feeling o f  "we can't come out on strike with you  because our 
factory isn't very secure, there are 4 million (unemployed) out 
there, and please give its coal, because i f  we can't get coal, and we 
can't keep producing, then we lose the market fo r  our factory's 
product and our factory will close".111
"A national movement grew which found 
women not only behind 'their' men but 
also beside and in front of them .... "
Alan Baker added that there are "certain ideas common 
to wide sections of the British working class, including the 
power and steel workers and some of the miners who went 
on strike, that if you keep your head down and battle on 
and make your industry profitable, it will survive, that 
somehow the government is trying to  make British 
industry competitive in order to live in the modern 
world".20
Defending and Transforming the Communities
hen you close a pit. you kill a community" was 
v l /  a common slogan in the pit villages, one 
'  * shortly adopted by pit communities in parts of 
N.S.W. It stated succinctly what the strike was about, and 
what the miners and those with whom they lived had 
always claimed it was about, the preservation of 
communities, households and jobs. Along with the Lodge 
organisation, the local committee of the Women Against 
_Pit Closures movement became central to working class 
resistance.
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tn Derbyshire alone, 40 miners' wives groups were 
formed, initially out o f  the material need to provide food,' 
but from this a national movement grew which found 
women not only behind "their" men but also beside and in 
front of them, "South Wales women threw off all that 
garbage about being 'behind' their men, and began 
occupying coal board offices, blockading steelworks gates 
and touring Europe putting the case for the defence of their 
comm unities. '"1 As a spokeswoman from the Bently 
Women's Action Group declared, "We've done everything 
the men have, we've done more, we've done kitchens, 
speaking, rallying, picketing, the only thing we haven't 
done is go down the pit and we intend lo do that when the 
strike is over",22
"The failure to hold a national ballot of 
NUM  miners was a tactical mistake .... "
The involvement of  working class women in political 
organising and campaigning has had a profound effect on 
gender relations within the communities. A woman from 
Bently commented, "At one time I didn't care about coal. 1 
(was) a wite, tnose things didn't  concern me".2-’ Women's 
involvement in broader political issues has been 
accompanied by a marked change in domestic social 
relations. Lorraine Bowlerfrom Barnslev Women's Action 
G roup told hundreds of women gathered for a Women 
Against Pit Closures (W A PC) rally,
I am sure I hat fo r  .tome or most o f  the women here today it is the 
same in their homes as it has been in mine over the weeks. There 
are arguments now as to whose turn it is to go on a demonstration 
or picket, and whose turn it is to babysit. Talk about jo b  sharing! 
We've seen it a t its best over the past eight or nine weeks.24
Or, in the words of another miner's wife radicalised in 
the struggle.
The Women Against Pit Closures movement has had, 
and will continue to ha%e, a dramatic effect on the working 
class's understanding of itself. Betty Heathfield of W APC 
told a rally on International Women's Day, shortly after 
the strike was over,
jVcw when we're in (the) pub we sit with the men and jo in  in 
instead o f  chatting about kids and hom e and things. We can sit 
with (them) and talk about (the) pit. We want to know  about 
things, about what's happening in the union. Som e mornings I've 
been picketing before him and I come home and he's done the 
housework. I've always thought well, men do the thinking. But I 
speak m y m ind now more than Tve ever done.25
We have defended our union against the most dastardly 
government ever known in this country. We are stronger today 
than ever. There is a strong body o f  women in every pit. We can't 
look backwards.
Many had seen the NUM and its members as 
overwhelmingly male and hence conservative in social 
values. This view is being challenged as men's lives are 
being changed. As Arthur Scargill said, the struggle "not 
only transformed the lives of women who. until that time, 
had had a narrow vision of what their role was and should 
be. It transformed our lives in the union."
Creating a Resistance Movement
r he most compelling leature of  the thousands of m iners 'support groups which sprang up throughout Britain during  that year was their incredible diversity 
and breadth. Trade unionists, ethnic organisations, 
women's groups, gay and lesbian organisations, individual 
Labour Party branches, all parties to the left o f  the Labour 
Party (though the S W P  was a latecomer to the support 
groups) forged what the industrial editor of the Financial 
Times called a ''network o f new alliances" which provided 
"vigorous, efficient and national support".
The women from Greenham Common were quick to 
comc "home" to the Welsh valleys whose women had 
initiated the Greenham protest, and food continued to 
arrive in West Wales from the Greenham women 
throughout the strike.
In Liverpool, 14 separate support groups raised one 
million pounds with contributions coming from most 
factories. The body plant at Ford Halewood give 1,000 
pounds every fortnight and another Ford plant between 
300 pounds and L300 pounds every week, lmp.essive 
support came from those areas already suffering the blight 
o f  de-industrialisation. Toxteth was one of the first places 
to develop a support group. The support group in Kirkby, 
another  Liverpool suburb shattered by economic collapse, 
achieved a 50 percent response to its door-to-door 
collections. The slogan of the London Dockland Miners' 
Support Group was "Don't let the mines go the say way as 
the docks" The secretary of the Docklands Group said, 
"We know from the experience of  what happened to us 
what will happen to them."26
Unemployed people were prominent in the work of the 
support groups and, in some places, such as the 
Merseyside, the unemployed staffed the centre which co­
ordinated the work of the various support groups.
In S ou tham pton , Cardiff, Manchester, York, Glasgow 
and Edinburgh "Lesbians and Gays Support the Miners" 
groups were established. In London, 3,000 pounds had 
been raised by December through regular collections at 
gay and lesbian clubs. In October, a large contingent of 
lesbians and gays were guests in the households of the 
Dulais Valley in Wales because of  their outstanding 
financial support for the valley.
Afro-Caribbean groups, Cypriot groups, the Asian 
community and Turkish people contributed and organised 
support. When the South Wales Striking Miners' Choir 
entertained an  entirely black audience in Walsall, one of 
the choristers thanked the "ethnic minorities" who had 
been outstanding in their support. A black spokesperson
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replied. "The Welsh are an  ethnic minority in Walsall".27 A 
Nottingham miner commented "I've never been racist, I 
don't think, but I'd never really understood it betore."
Peace groups, too, have contributed to the miners" 
support and the slogan "Mines not Missiles" became 
common at CN D rallies. The Enfield women's peace group 
in London wrote,
We were inspired by the women, We wanted to show them that 
thev weren't alone, that we need each other. Our links with the 
women in Cannock have helped overcome our isolation and  
sense o f  powerlessness.ls
A conference convened in December was attended by 
representatives from 1500 support groups. This was an 
organisational expression of what one com m enta to r  has 
termed "a network of unexpected alliances"2'1 constituting 
overall what Hywel Francis has called a resistance 
movement which sustained about half a million people for 
nearly a year. He commented, "even more perceptive and 
revealing was the simple ceremony in Italy during the 
strike when women activists from Coelbren and Hirwaun 
were made honorary members of the Italian resistance".50
Wales: Building a State Within the State
r r f h e  South Wales coalfield with over 20,000 miners 
[ t  remained solid and, after 10 months, only one 
percent had broken the strike, despite the initial 
reluctance o f  most South Wales lodges to strike. In the 14 
central valleys, only 14 had returned to work by mid- 
January. In the two pits of the North Wales field, support 
was patchy and collapsed in November when most of the 
2,000 mineworkers went back.
In July 1984, the Welsh miners became the first victims 
of the new anti-union legislation brought dow n by the 
Thatcher government. Sequestrators not only froze union 
funds but also money raised for food right across the 
coalfields. The response of the Welsh communities was 
overwhelming. Welsh women and men addressed 
hundreds of meetings each week, "twinned" pit villages 
with factories and working class suburbs, and organised 
large co-ordinating centres in Liverpool, Birmingham. 
Oxford, Bristol, Southam pton , Swindon. Reading and 
London.’1
Spring 1985
The task of feeding up to 20,000 households meant the 
development of an alternative welfare state within Wales. 
Howells commented,
Our defences were fo u n d  badly wanting. The citadel was falling  
apart. The people o f  the coalfields had no choice but to createnew 
defences and in building them they discovered o ld  socialist and  
collectivist truths. They realsied that by uniting and  sharing all 
that they had. they could survive and overcome the worst that the 
present state apparatus could throw at them.12
W ith  the fa i lu re  o f  L a b o u r s  p a r l i a m e n ta ry  
representatives to provide an effective national support 
structure for the movement of resistance, support groups 
throughout Waless "got on with the job"  and organised an 
alternative welfare system, a  system of distribution 
according to need.
The Wales Congress in Support of Mining Communities 
is the Welsh national political expression of the multitude 
of tangible, cross-cutting and overlapping alliances, 
expressing the links with the women's and peace 
movements, local authorities fighting funding cuts, the 
unemployed, the Communist Party, Labour Party 
b r a n c h e s ,  P la id  C y m ru  ( n a t i o n a l i s t ) ,  c u l t u r a l  
organisations, gay and lesbian groups, environmental 
groups and the churches.
Congress delegates continued to meet weekly to set 
priorities and guidelines for the development and 
maintenance of the new welfare system and to  discuss 
strategy and tactics. When the strike ended, the Congress 
met again on 17 March and decided to continue the 
struggle in defence of the communities.
"That the strike was inevitable from day 
one of Thatcher's second term and that 
the stakes being played for were so high 
never seemed to be fully grasped by the 
Labour leadership .... "
Support lo r  the miners' struggle transcended national 
boundaries. Scargill was very aware of the significance of 
international support and was deeply appreciative of the 
efforts of Australian workers. On 9 March, he told 9,000 
people attending an International Women's Day rally.
The Australian government contacted the Seamen's Union o f  
Australia and said: 'Now the strike is over, will you release the 
coal and let it be transported overseasT The Seamen's Union 
cabled the NU M  and said they would only release coal when the 
NU M  told them the strike was at an end. That's internationalism, 
that's trade unionism.
Can We Draw Lessons?
r  hatcher is not Hawke, the NUM  is not the Miners Federation, Women Against Pit Closures is not the Miners Women's Auxiliaries, the National Coal 
Board is not the Joint Coal Board, C R A , BHP, Shell and 
British Petroleum, the Dulais Valley is not the 
Burragorang Valley, the TUC is not the ACTU , the British 
Labour Party is not the A LP and the CPG B is not the 
CPA.
The lessons that can be drawn, given these and other 
.. major differences, are limited. If inferences can be made
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they probably apply to specific tactical instances or to the 
more general level — the identification of  tendencies and 
sets of issues, rather than to the perhaps more useful area 
of strategies.
In the first case, I am puzzled by a number of things. 
Why did the Yorkshire N U M  not tread carefully and 
gently, instead of crossing rapidly and vehemently into 
Nottinghamshire and so driving the Notts miners into a 
position from which they could not shift?
Why were the pits in which a majority struck not 
occupied to  keep the minority out, thus keeping the focus 
on coal and jobs rather than on picketing?
Why didn't the lodges put non-production care and 
maintenance crews into the struck pits to prevent the 
sterilisation tha t  sometimes occurred, in so doing making 
the point that the coal was not MacGregor's but the 
people's, and would be conserved for them by the miners?
Given the intensity and significance of the struggle, why 
didn't the NUM  leadership heed trie opinion polls, or, 
given wall-to-wall academics and social scientists 
supporting the struggle, why didn't they conduct one of 
their own membership?
Does the isolation of the NUM  within the trade union 
movement suggest that industry specific unions may be 
structurally less able to generate union support than 
general unions whose members are spread across 
industries?
More broadly, it has been fashionable of late to take the 
rather useful insights that the state itself is sometimes 
conflicted, that it does not always and everywhere 
necessarily act in the interests o f  the capitalist class, that 
genuine though partial victories can be won from it, and to 
draw from these insights an extreme position that says that 
the state does not represent, articulate, advance and defend 
the interests of the capitalist class overall.
If there is one fashionable myth that cannot survive the 
strike, it is that. The British miners faced a sustained 
militant, carefully planned campaign organised by the 
parliamentary executive of the state and carried through 
by its agencies.
That the NUM survived at ali is remarkable. That the 
NUM was not destroyed is attributable to  the massive and 
sustained support that it received; that it did not win is 
attributable to  the support it did not receive, from within 
itself and from other trade unions.
J he principle lesson of the strike must be that no section of  the trade union movement can face a mobilised and confrontationist state and win
without the active support of other sections of the union 
movement. It was this support that was largely absent, 
with the consequence that, while the struggle could be, and 
was, sustained, it was not, and could not be, won.
The failure of large sections o f  the trade uniot 
movement to  support the miners at the point of 
production, the only place where people's power can be 
unambiguously decisive is, as I have suggested, largely a 
function of depressed economic circumstances which rob 
workers of the resources and confidence to struggle in that 
way.
But the lack of such support must also be laid squarely a; 
the doors of other actors within the trade union movement, 
the political parties, who failed during the last decade to 
help trade union activists understand the class nature of 
union politics, and to forge relations based on that 
understanding across trade union organisations,
The lefts o f  the British Labour Party continue the 
thankless jo b  of stacking and restacking branches only to 
find, when they finally make some ground, that the rulei 
are changed. They continue to fail to organise around 
workplaces and industries and continue to encourage some 
of their more able members into the pleasant wilderness of 
parliamentary backbenchism.
"Many people new to political involvement have 
become experienced and effective speakers, 
expert organisers and confident socialists, theif 
confidence based on a growing understanding 
that the a priori equation of revolutionary 
politics with the margins is as unnecessary as it is 
destructive."
The Com m unsit Party, with a fixed and deliberate 
intent, continues to  shoot its toes off, and both parties have 
failed to provide the political education which would help 
trade union activists look beyond their immediate 
concerns to  the equally vital concerns of the class as a 
whole. Such schooling, said Eric Hobsbawn, "the 
Com m unist Party (of  Great Britain) provided for 
generations of  workers and intellectuals, men and 
women".33 But it does so no longer. Nonetheless, as 
Massey and Wainwright-14 stressed, a lot has been learned.
Many people new to political involvement have become 
experienced and effective speakers, expert organisers and 
confident socialists, their confidence based on a growing 
understanding that the a priori equation of revolutionary 
politics with the margins is as unnecessary as it is
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destructive. There has also been the learning of other new 
skills — how to manage thousands o f  pounds on behalf of 
iiundreds of people, how to confront and overcome the* 
real problems of building an alternative welfare system. 
Massey and Wainwright concluded
in much o f  their wow, many o f  the support groups illustrate in 
practice the kind o f  movement we need to build in order to 
achieve socialism. A commitment to change through building up 
democratic power at the base, in the factories and communities; a 
breaking down o f  the traditional, inhibiting boundary between 
wade unionism and politics; a sense o f  hea l strength and identity 
which at the same rime is not parochial; a commitment to a non- 
sectarian bur principled form  o f unity, in which different political 
tendencies are respected and work together; an emphasis on 
reaching out, a confidence that radical demands can be popular i f  
they are argued for.
f Loretta Loach, a member ot the Spare Rib  collective, 
has commented, "through the links that have been 
established a learning process has taken place, one which 
has been mutually beneficial to working class women and 
middle class feminists".35 The women's organisations 
continue in the communities, with the full support o f  the 
NUM, as does the Welsh Congress in Support of Mining 
Communities. There is not, and never was, an  inherent 
exclusivity between class politics and the social 
movements, nor is it just a matter of adding them together. 
What is important is the recognition and fostering of their 
mutual interdependence and influence. As Hobsbawn 
points out, the broad alliance is a necessary complement to 
class politics, not an alternative to it.36 While support 
groups were, in important ways, prefiguratjve of the sorts 
of organisations which socialists seek to build in a new 
world, and were necessary for victory to be won, they were 
, not sufficient to attain it without the decisive support of 
workers organised at the point of production.
Mike Donaldson teaches sociology and is ■ member of the Centre 
for Technology and Social Change at the University of 
Wollongong. He was in Britain as th strike ended.
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